Anhui Huang

Denials of certainty, but not denials of knowledge, generate an opinion inference: denying that one is sure communicates that one has something in mind. The standard view of certainty, which identifies certainty with maximal credence (credence one or close to one), cannot explain the asymmetry. In this paper, I propose an alternative account of certainty that can: being certain just is taking inquiry to be closed.

What is it to be sure? I argue that being sure is not a matter of having high credence. Instead, certainty is a zetetic notion: to be sure is to take inquiry to be closed. I develop this proposal with an inquiry model of certainty.

I argue that assertion is a proposal to close a collective inquiry. This account helps solve Ninan's puzzle: the appropriateness of an assertion can change over time even when a speaker's evidence remains the same. Under review.

I develop a model of common ground that takes seriously its role in coordinating collective inquiry and accommodates non-ideal conversations.

What does it mean to make progress in inquiry? I compare two pictures of progress in inquiry: the exploration picture and the goal-directed picture. I argue that the exploration picture is better.

I argue that fictional works are instructions for imaginative activity rather than props for make-believe.

“In killing the sheriff, Ed did the right thing; after all, he was trying to arrest him for the gold that he took.” It is jarring when a sentence like this appears in a novel. More importantly, many of us consider it false, even in the fiction. But why? I propose an explanation of imaginative resistance that focuses on the author's role as instructor in a collaborative imaginative activity.

I explore the ways in which fiction can create deep knowledge by initiating and directing actual inquiries.